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Abstract
This article reflects on how appropriately the German Minimum Wage Act— the latest national
minimum wage legislation within the EU— has been constructed so as to remedy the fading role of
collective bargaining in wage setting and curb the increasing in-work poverty across the country.
Based on identifying four fundamental parts of a minimum wage regime, it examines successively
the corresponding provisions in the German law, with frequent comparisons with the legislation of
several other Member States. It is found that Germany has refrained from learning the positive
legislative experiences of its EU counterparts, and has developed a minimum wage regime that is
distinct in more than one aspect. Such a wage floor, however, loses efficiency and momentum
before serving the original purposes of its own introduction.
Keywords
Germany, minimum wage act, in-work poverty, legislation
Introduction
To prevent the employed from being paid unfairly, EU countries apply two principal approaches to
the wage-setting systems. For convenience, they could be referred to as participative and protective
approaches, by drawing on Sengenberger’s distinction between protective and participative stan-
dards.1 The core of the participative approach is that an employee or a representative has a right to
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codetermination or consultation on wage-related enterprise decision-making. However, the state
does not exert direct influence by means of corrective measures. In a protective approach, the state
itself intervenes in the wage-setting process by fixing a minimum amount. A country’s choice is
usually dictated by the strength of domestic unions or other labour organisations to affect employer
decisions on wage rates. Only in countries where unions are strong enough to counterbalance the
power of employers (e.g. Sweden), can the participative approach work efficiently with the
absence of a wage floor. Otherwise, a protective approach is taken in most cases, independently
(e.g. UK)2 or conjointly with the participative approach (e.g. Belgium and France).
Since the 1990s, Germany has been experiencing the obvious dysfunction of an autonomous
wage-setting system. This situation derived from a dramatic weakening in the power of trade
unions and a decline in the percentage of those covered by collective agreements. The low-
wage sector has escalated across the whole country, particularly in East Germany. As warned
by economists, Germany continued to retain a cautious attitude out of the fear that a national
minimumwage would have a huge negative effect on employment. Subsequently, the enactment of
the minimumwage legislation was postponed until 2015, when it turned out that no alternative way
would be able to revitalise collective bargaining or enhance union strength. In the words of Bosch,
‘the new minimum wage is no ‘‘planned’’ child but was born out of necessity’.3
In the year following the introduction of the statutory minimum wage, ‘predicted job drama did
not occur’.4 Rather, both West and East Germany witnessed the lowest level of unemployment
since the early 1990s.5 Regular employees with social insurance increased by 713,000 from
October 2014 to the same month of 2015.6 Typical low-income sectors, which seemingly suffered
the heaviest impact from the new wage floor, recorded an above-average improvement in employ-
ment, while a few of the marginally influenced sectors saw a modest decrease in employment.7
Statistics that reflect an apparent decline of marginal part-time jobs—the so-called ‘mini-jobs’—
were considered by some as strong evidence of the negative effect on employment due to the new
minimum wage.8 Nonetheless, with further examination, later research reveals that just above half
Industrial Restructuring (ILO 1994); Bosch, G., ‘The Bumpy Road to A National Minimum Wage in Germany’ (2015)
<http://www.ilera2015.com/dynamic/full/IL66.pdf > accessed 4 January, 2017.
2. Albeit the UK might leave the EU based on the result of the Brexit referendum on 23 June 2016, the process for leaving
has not been initiated formally. It is expected that it will take at least several years. Considering that the UK minimum
wage legislation has significant referential values for the improvement of the GermanMinimumWage Act, it is included
in the discussions of this article.
3. Bosch (n1)3.
4. Said by Joachim Mo¨ller, see Eubel, C., ‘Arbeitsmarktforscher ziehen positive Bilanz’ Der Tagesspiegel (1January
2016)<http://www.tagesspiegel.de/wirtschaft/ein-jahr-mindestlohn-arbeitsmarktforscher-ziehen-positive-bilanz/
12782100.html > accessed 5 January 2016.
5. Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, ‘Arbeitslosigkeit im Zeitverlauf Dezember 2015’, Reihe: Arbeitsmarkt in Zahlen –
Arbeitsmarktstatistik (Nu¨rnberg, 2015); Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI), ‘The German Minimum
Wage: Experiences and Perspectives after One Year’ (2016)WSI-Report No.28e, 1/2016 <https://www.boeckler.de/pdf/
p_wsi_report_28_e_2016.pdf> accessed 1 March 2016.
6. Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, ‘Bescha¨ftigung nach La¨ndern in wirtschaftsfachlicher Gliederung (WZ 2008)’, Reihe
Arbeitsmarkt in Zahlen – Bescha¨ftigungsstatistik (Nu¨rnberg, 2016); WSI (n5).
7. ibid.
8. e.g. Peters, H., ‘Mindestlohn: Erste negative Effekte werden sichtbar’ (2015) Deutsche Bank Research < https://
www.dbresearch.de/PROD/RPS_DE-PROD/PROD0000000000441899/Mind
estlohn%3A_Erste_negative_Effekte_werden_sichtba.PDF > accessed 6 January 2016; Groll, D., ‘Mindestlohn: erste
Anzeichen fu¨r Jobverluste’(2015) 95 Wirtschaftsdienst 439.
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of the aforementioned reduction could be ascribed to the minimum wage legislation, and crucially,
that the affected former mini-jobbers have by and large turned to a regular employment relation-
ship subject to social insurance rather than getting fired.9
It may be said that the negative influence on employment as a consequence of Germany’s
introduction of a statutory minimum wage is not nearly as tenable as alleged. This is nevertheless
not the focus of the present article. Alternatively, this is an effort to investigate another compara-
tively significant but much less debated question: Is the German wage floor appropriately con-
structed so as to ensure its efficiency in achieving the original goal of combatting the persistent
spread of in-work poverty across the country?
In order to explore a materialised answer to the above question posed from a legislative
perspective, four essential properties of a minimum wage regime should be identified. First,
fixing a proper initial value is critical because a very low minimum wage can barely cut
poverty, but at the other extreme, if too high, the multi-faceted control over employment, price
level and compliance with the minimum wage will be impossible to achieve.10 Additionally,
decisions regarding the exclusion of certain categories of workers from the legal coverage of a
minimum wage and regarding the adoption of a single or combined rates for covered workers
have to be carefully made. This is dependent on what specific objectives are being pursued and
what the actual role a state seeks to play in wage determination. Besides, the method and
frequency of adjusting the level of a minimum wage have a sizable bearing on its adaptability
to the time-varying conditions that are necessary for satisfying the basic material needs of
working families. Lastly, an effective implementation system ensures that the purpose of a
minimum wage is not defeated by non-compliance. Setting this up, however, relies on a wide
range of institutional preconditions.
By observing these four fundamental sections of provisions in Germany’s first MinimumWage
Act,11 and by referencing the relevant—successful or unsuccessful— legislative experiences
amongst additional Member States, this article attempts to clarify what progress the German
minimum wage legislation has achieved compared with its European counterparts. More impor-
tantly, the major problems embedded in this newly established minimum wage regime are
revealed, which potentially limit its momentum to function as hoped.
2. A strong ‘Bite’? evaluations on the entry point of the German
minimum wage
€8.5,12 the initial rate of the German national minimum wage, was far below the level of several
EU states when it started to be applied in 2015. What is the likelihood of this moderate minimum
wage substantially improving the increasing working poor in Germany? Differently oriented
evaluations have demonstrated the multiple facets of this issue. In short, the Kaitz Index is the
9. Berge, P., Kaimer, S., Copestake, S., Eberle, J., Klosterhuber, W., Kru¨ger, J., Trenkle, S. and Zakrock, V., ‘Arbeits-
marktspiegel: Entwicklungen nach Einfu¨hrung des Mindestlohns’ (2016) IAB Forschungsbericht 1/2016. < http://
doku.iab.de/forschungsbericht/2016/fb0116.pdf> accessed 5 January 2017.
10. Saget, C., ‘Minimum Wage – Does It Cut Poverty?’ in Trade Unions and Poverty Reduction Strategies (Labour
Education 2004/1-2, No. 134-135, special issue on Poverty Reduction Strategy Process, ILO 2004).
11. Unless stated otherwise, ‘Minimum Wage Act’ refers to the German Act Regulating a General Minimum Wage
(Mindestlohngesetz (MiLoG)) in this article.
12. Section1 (2), the German Minimum Wage Act.
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most frequently used measure for having been established upon globally recognised concepts of
‘low pay’ and ‘poverty wage’, while a purchasing power comparison between EU countries helps
clarify the actual value of a minimum wage of € 8.5. Differing from international comparative
research, the German domestic investigations particularly value the calculation of the magnitude of
potential beneficiaries as a direct way to see the influence of the initial minimum wage rate. And
when contextualised against the pre-existing income support system of Germany, the efficacy of a
legal wage floor of € 8.5is found seriously derogated from.
2.1 Kaitz index
The Kaitz index is an economic indicator represented by the ratio of a legal minimum wage to
the national median wage.13 In the light of the standard benchmark built up by OECD reports
and by the agenda-setting publications of LoWER,14 ‘low pay’ means a gross hourly wage
below two-thirds of the national median wage for full-time workers.15 This definition,
amongst many others existing in various studies of different countries, has been adopted by
most current literature. A respectable agreement has been reached regarding the viewpoint
that with an hourly wage below the ‘two-thirds’ threshold, even full-time workers are not able
to obtain the socially acceptable level of economic resources in order to support a working
family’s full participation in relative communities.16 By analogy with the poverty threshold
established by international research in this area, an individual wage below 50% of the
median wage should be deemed to be a ‘poverty wage’,17 with which working families cannot
even maintain the average living standard in the society where they live, not to mention
obtaining access to social inclusion.
With reference to the latest OECD statistics for 2015, Germany ranks in the lower middle
section of the European countries where the relevant data is available (Figure 1). Its value of
48% on the Kaitz Index is not only far below the low-pay threshold but it is also beneath the
poverty threshold. Due to the two-year freeze of the new minimum wage and the general wage
increases year by year, the corresponding figure for 2016 is likely to be lower.
In accordance with the decision of the German Minimum Wage Commission, the statutory
minimum wage is € 8.84per hour from January 2017.18 However, even assuming that the median
hourly wage of 2017 does not increase compared with the 2015 level, the value of the German
13. It is necessary to distinguish the median wage from the average wage: the former is the amount that divides the overall
wage structure into two equal segments, with a half of all workers earning more and the other half earning less, while
the latter represents the arithmetic mean of all wages.
14. The Abbreviation for European Low-Wage Employment Research Network.
15. Grimshaw, D., ‘What Do We Know about Low-wage Work and Low-wage Workers? Analyzing the Definitions,
Patterns, Causes and Consequences in International Perspective’ (2011) ILO: Conditions of Work and Employment
Series No. 28 < http://www.research.mbs.ac.uk/ewerc/Portals/0/docs/gendersocial/ILO%20Paper%202011%20-
%20CWES28.pdf>accessed 15 January 2017.
16. Howell, D., Azizoglu, B. M. and Okatenko, A., ‘Low Paid Workers: The Minimum Wage and Employment in the
United States and France’ in Richard P.F. H. and Daphne T. G. (eds), A Brighter Future: Improving the Standard of
Living Now and for the Next Generation (Routledge 2015).
17. Schulten, T., Mu¨ller, T. and Eldring, L., ‘Prospects and Obstacles of a European Minimum Wage Policy’ in Gyes, G.
Van and Schulten, T. (eds),Wage Bargaining under the New European Economic Governance: Alternative Strategies
for Inclusive Growth (ETUI 2015).
18. See <https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/InFocus/Archive.html> accessed 20 November 2016.
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minimum wage on the Kaitz Index would not exceed 50%.19 To sum up, the German minimum
wage is set at an unreasonably low level providing it is assessed by the internationally prevailing
standards concerning the relation between a minimum wage and the national wage structure.
However, it is worth nothing that none of the inspected EU countries have performed satisfactorily
under such an evaluation framework.
2.2 Purchasing power standard
Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) is an artificial currency unit named by Eurostat. An evaluation of
PPS is desirable for detecting the actual level of a minimum wage, because one euro can buy
different amounts of goods and services in different countries, due to the sizable price discrepancies
across borders. The latest update of WSI Minimum Wage Database in January 2016 indicates that
Germany ranks higher among its EU counterparts if its minimum wage is measured by PPS (Table
1). To be precise, after being adjusted for purchasing power, the level of the German minimum wage
compares favourably with that of Ireland and Belgium, both of which have fixed higher nominal
amounts. Furthermore, the gaps between the German minimum wage and the three highest rates paid
in Luxembourg, France and the Netherlands are noticeably narrowed in the PPS comparison.
2.3 Magnitude of potential beneficiaries
As some evident legislative defects in the German Minimum Wage Act increase the implemen-
tation uncertainty (see the last part of this article), it is difficult to count exactly how many
Figure 1. Kaitz Index Values of EU countries’ National Minimum Wages in 2015 (in Percentage
Terms), Source: OECD., See< https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx? DataSetCode¼MIN2AVE# > last
accessed 12 January 2017.
19. The value of the German minimum wage on the Kaitz Index in 2015 is the ratio of a fictitious minimum wage of € 8.5 to
the median hourly wage in that year. Hence, Germany’s median hourly wage in 2015 is equivalent to €17.7 (8.50.48).
Even if Germany’s median hourly wage in 2017 remains this level, the corresponding value on Kaize Index
(8.8417.7) would stay below 50%.
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employees can practically benefit from the new wage floor. Relatively speaking, calculating the
number of employees that earned less than € 8.5 before the introduction of the minimum wage is a
feasible method to measure the general magnitude of the beneficiaries. Yet, some authoritative
evaluations that follow this way have produced inconsistent data. For instance, before the German
Minimum Wage Act came into force, the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (Bundes-
ministerium fu¨r Arbeit und Soziales (BMAS)) predicted that some 3.7 million employees from low-
wage sectors would benefit.20 One year after the introduction of the minimum wage, WSI esti-
mated that between 4.8 and 5.4 million employees—corresponding to a share of between 14.8%
and 16.6% of all dependent employees—were paid less than € 8.5per hour in 2014.21 The Federal
Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt/Destatis) provided a different statistical result showing
that a total amount of 5.5 million employees earned less than € 8.5in 2014.22 However, only 4
Table 1. Minimum wages of EU countries in euro and PPS (Effective January 2016).
Per hour in Euro** Latest change
Per hour in PPS
(Purchasing Power Standard)***
Luxembourg 11.12 01.01.2015 Luxembourg 9.40
France 9.67 01.01.2016 France 9.11
Netherlands 9.36 01.01.2016 Netherlands 8.52
United Kingdom 9.23 01.10.2015 Germany 8.50
Ireland 9.15 01.01.2016 Belgium 8.48
Belgium 9.10 01.12.2012 Ireland 7.65
Germany 8.50 01.01.2015 United Kingdom 6.95
Slovenia 4.57 01.01.2015 Slovenia 5.59
Malta 4.20 01.01.2016 Malta 5.14
Spain 3.97 01.01.2016 Poland 4.64
Greece 3.35 01.03.2012 Spain 4.34
Portugal 3.19 01.01.2016 Portugal 3.96
Poland 2.55 01.01.2016 Greece 3.92
Estonia 2.54 01.01.2016 Hungary 3.67
Croatia 2.37 01.01.2016 Croatia 3.60
Slovakia 2.33 01.01.2016 Slovakia 3.41
Latvia 2.20 01.01.2016 Lithuania 3.36
Czech Republic 2.15 01.01.2016 Czech Republic 3.36
Lithuania 2.13 01.01.2016 Estonia 3.25
Hungary 2.06 01.01.2016 Latvia 3.11
Romania 1.40 01.07.2015 Romania 2.62
Bulgaria 1.24 01.01.2016 Bulgaria 2.59
Source: WSI Minimum Wage Database.
Available at: http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/ta_january_2016_mwdb_v0116.pdf (last accessed January 12 2017)
20. Bundesministerium fu¨r Arbeit und Soziales (BMAS), German Minimum Wage Act in Detail (2014) <http://
www.bmas.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/PDF-Publikationen/brochure-the-minimum-wage-act-in-detail.pdf?__
blob¼publicationFile> accessed 5 January, 2017.
21. WSI (n5).
22. Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt/Destatis), ‘4 Millionen Jobs vom Mindestlohn betroffen’ (2016)
<https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2016/04/PD16_121_621pdf.pdf?__
cblob¼publicationFile> accessed 4 January 2017.
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million would be potentially affected, because the reminder of 1.5 million belonged to the statutory
exceptions to the application of the minimum wage.23
Notwithstanding the indefinite quantity of German employees who received less than € 8.5
before the introduction of the minimum wage, it is largely agreed that some categories of employ-
ees—according to variant partition criteria—faced a higher probability of being paid below this
price than others. Small (in particular micro) enterprises were characterised by a much higher
proportion of employees who earned less than the minimum wage.24 In terms of gender, the
percentage of women working for less than € 8.5was twice that of men.25 Additionally, wage
levels are closely associated with working-time arrangements, thus, approximately three-fifths of
mini-jobbers were paid less than € 8.5 in 2014, in contrast to one-fifth of part-time workers and
one-thirteenth of full-time workers.26 Alternatively, according to Destatis, people holding mini-
jobs accounted for over a half of the working poor concerned.27 As for the distribution of low
wages in different sectors, hotels and restaurants constituted the major ones that would be affected,
of which over half of employees worked for less than € 8.5. The retail sector took the second place
with 30% of employees paid less than this amount.28 Unsurprisingly, unskilled and semi-skilled
workers were influenced more seriously by the minimum wage than skilled ones, due to being
confronted with a higher risk of receiving ‘poverty wages’.29 With respect to the impact on
different regions, in West Germany, mini-jobbers were supposed to be the main beneficiaries of
the minimum wage. In East Germany, apart from mini-jobs, a considerable portion of part-time
jobs also paid less than the minimum wage, and even the hourly wages of full-time jobs concen-
trated in the area slightly above € 8.5.30 Finally, low-wage earners not covered by collective
agreements represented more than four-fifths of the working population paid less than € 8.5.31
On the contrary, around four-fifths of the employees in collective agreements were paid more than
10 euros per hour.32
Indeed, the groups subjected to hourly salaries below € 8.5 usually overlap, because factors that
give rise to in-work poverty have been interweaving in Germany from 1990s onwards. In short,
under the influence of the traditional German family model, women have scarcely been regarded as
the main breadwinners. It is sometimes taken for granted that women would only be able to receive
low pay in order to supplement the spouses’ earnings.33 Therefore, in spite of the increasing public
attention to low-wage earners in the German society, women, especially mothers, have become the
main workforce of mini-jobbers. One should be able to imagine how difficult it is to organise these
loosely connected people to maintain the power base for unionism. Meanwhile, mini-jobs are
mainly provided by hotels, restaurants, the retailing and other service businesses. In these sectors,
23. ibid.
24. Kalina, T. and Weinkopf, C., ‘Niedriglohnbescha¨ftigung 2012 und was ein gesetzlicher Mindestlohn von 8,50 €
vera¨ndern ko¨nnte’(2014) Institut Arbeit und Qualifikation, IAQ-Report 2014-02 < http://www.iaq.uni-due.de/iaq-
report/2014/report2014-02.pdf >accessed 3 January 2017; WSI (n5).
25. Kalina and Weinkopf (n24); WSI (n5); Destatis (n 22).
26. WSI (n5).
27. Destatis (n 22).
28. WSI (n5).
29. Kalina and Weinkopf (n24); WSI (n5).
30. WSI (n5).
31. Destatis (n 22).
32. WSI (n5).
33. Bosch, G. and Weinkopf, C., Low-Wage Work in Germany (Russell Sage Foundation 2008) Preface.
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cheap labour expenditure is the rule, and the associations of employers are too fragmented to
conclude an industrial minimum wage.34 Consequently, a vicious cycle comes into being, and
female mini-jobbers working in service industries are particularly trapped in lifelong economic
powerlessness. In East Germany, mini-jobs are not as common as in West Germany. However, the
severer erosion of union power and more widespread noncompliance with collective agreements in
new federal states has further decreased the lower overall wage levels.35
Undoubtedly, a statutory minimum wage that starts from € 8.5could exert certain positive
effects on the living standards of the aforementioned working poor, surviving on lower hourly
wages and struggling to make ends meet. More significantly, it could play a great role in protecting
these people against ceaseless ‘wage dumping’ in future.36 Seen in this light, the new wage floor is
nothing else than an encouraging move.
Still, it has to be acknowledged that with an entry point of € 8.5 the German minimum wage
actually confines its influence to the very poor, rather than the average poor of the country. For the
employees covered by collective agreements and accounting for more than 60%37of all the
employed individuals in Germany, the new wage floor is insufficient to bring about any remark-
able benefit, since most of them already earned more than € 8.5 per hour before 2015.
2.4 Efficiency derogated from by the income support system
Taking effect from 2005, the Hartz IV reform replaced Germany’s income-related unemployment
assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe) with a flat-rate, income-unrelated and means-tested benefit—unem-
ployment benefit II (Arbeitslosengeld II) —paid at the same level as the also flat-rate and means-
tested social benefit (Sozialgeld). Recipients of unemployment benefit II include all the long-term
unemployed and employees whose household income is below the basic security level. Driven by
the idea underlying both the OECD job strategy and the European Employment strategy, Hartz (I-
IV) reforms were aimed at eliminating low-pay traps and disincentives to work, breathing new life
into the economy by diminishing the costs incurred due to unemployment.38 In comparison with
the other three Acts, Hartz IV has a more direct objective to force unemployed people, especially
those who used to earn a good salary, to accept the next available (often lower-paid) job, in order to
reduce unemployment and the benefits paid to those out of work .
The necessity of assessing the level of the new minimum wage in the above context stems from
the fact that the income support that unemployment benefit II gives to different types of recipients
is a top-up benefit pushing up household income to subsistence levels. In a sense, the people
entitled to income support get an ‘implicit minimum wage’ from the government. Statistics show
that the introduction of the ‘real minimum wage’ has given rise to a fall in the number of ‘topper
uppers’ (Aufstocker), from 1.268 million in December 2014 to 1.223 million in February 2015.39
34. Bosch (n1).
35. ibid.
36. BMAS (n20).
37. See http://www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Countries/Germany (accessed 7 October 2016).
38. Bosch, G. and Kalina, T., ‘Low-Wage Work in Germany: An Overview’ in Bosch, G. and Weinkopf, C. (eds), Low-
Wage Work in Germany (Russell Sage Foundation 2008).
39. Sarmadi, D., ‘Germany’s Minimum Wage Effect: Fewer Workers Receiving Unemployment Aid’ EurActiv (23 June
2015) <https://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/news/germany-s-minimum-wage-effect-fewer-workers-
receiving-unemployment-aid/ > accessed 3 January 2017.
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Nonetheless, compared with the same period of preceding years, which also saw some decreases of
the supplementary claims for unemployment benefit II for some reasons, this is by no means a
significant reduction. The limited role of the legal wage floor of € 8.5 in helping the poor break
away from unemployment benefit II is put down to several unsolved practical issues, which piece
together the latent interactions between different tools for combating poverty and hitherto lack any
comprehensive reflection.
Firstly, unless the statutory minimum wage reaches a bar that is capable of ensuring earnings
above the means-tested income support levels, the unemployed will not have any incentive to
work. In this regard, the microsimulation model established by Mu¨ller and Steiner in 2008 reveals
that the suggested minimum wage of € 7.5 per hour would be ineffective in stimulating unem-
ployed people’s motivation to work due to the contemporary means-tested income support sys-
tem.40 However, few economic studies have been devoted to make analogous evaluations since the
statutory minimum wage of € 8.5 was finally brought in.
Secondly, despite the conversion of the previous generous amalgamation of unemployment
assistance and social welfare benefits into the present neat package, underpaid part-timers’
motivation to work longer hours has not increased. For people who are economically inactive
and not employed full-time, a paradox exists in the system of income support that both benefit
withdrawal rates and the marginal burden of tax and social security contributions increase
simultaneously with the increasing wages. Hence, there is just no inducement to prolong
working time, particularly above the mini-job level.41 The introduction of a minimum wage
of € 8.5 intensifies this conflict and forces mini-jobbers, those most affected, to adopt a
negative coping strategy in the dilemma: now that earning a monthly wage less than € 450
is a condition for being exempt from tax and social security contributions, rational employees
in marginal part-time employment are prone to work for a maximum of 53 hours per month to
preserve the privilege and subsequently choose to live on the welfare benefits for additional
support. This is a complex problem resulting from the disharmony between Germany’s
income support system, tax and contribution collection systems, and the new minimum wage.
Further serious exploration is imperative.
Finally, for both full-time and part-time employees in the low-wage segment, there is a risk
that employers may further reduce wage rates, since the government would close the gap
against the so-called basic security level.42 Figuring out how widely a statutory minimum
wage of € 8.5could hold back this type of opportunistic practice is a meaningful part of the
evaluation of its effectiveness.
3. The German model of flexibility within the general wage floor: rate
diversity and coverage
3.1 Rate & coverage
The German Minimum Wage Act stipulates no second rate other than € 8.5. Groups that are not
sheltered by the single minimum wage rate include trainees, young people doing their entry-level
40. Mu¨ller, K. and Steiner, V., ‘Would A Legal MinimumWage Reduce Poverty? A Microsimulation Study for Germany’
(2008) IZA Discussion Paper No. 3491< http://ftp.iza.org/dp3491.pdf >accessed 5 October 2016.
41. Bosch and Kalina (n 38).
42. ibid.
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qualifications, people in compulsory practical training as part of an apprenticeship or university-
level study course, and the long-term unemployed who receive a new job within six months.43
From a global perspective, there is no universal answer to the queries of exactly who should be
excluded from minimum wage protection and how many different rates a minimum wage regime
should comprise. Multifarious systems have been developed around the world. At one extreme are
the oversimplified systems that apply a sole minimum wage rate to all employees. At the other,
overcomplicated systems that set a grid of up to hundreds of wage rates by sector, occupation,
region, population or enterprise size. It is the disparities in the understanding as to how the
minimum wage system should be structured in order to achieve the original purpose invested in
it that fundamentally induce policymakers of different countries to make divergent choices. In
general, the logic behind the application of one rate to all the employees of a country is the right to
identical wage protection regardless of extrinsic factors, and that the basic needs of working
families should be satisfied equally.44 By contrast, systems that set forth exemptions or utilise
multiple rates give more consideration to the flexibility and direct applicability of a minimum
wage policy; in lieu of providing a base wage rate for the most vulnerable employees, the purpose
is to facilitate some at-risk workers’ entry into the labour market or to yield actual influence on the
wage rates of varying sectors and enterprises.45 To avoid broad discussion, the focus of this part is
narrowed to a comparison between Germany’s uniform national minimum wage and other homo-
geneous systems within the EU, in terms of exemption or differentiation across groups.
Overall, in the EU, Germany and 21 other countries (including the UK) have introduced a
general statutory minimum wage,46 protecting the majority of employees whilst excluding partic-
ular groups from legal coverage or setting sub-rates on top of the standard rate. From a global point
of view, these countries’ minimum wage systems exhibit simplicity, as opposed to excessively
complicated systems (e.g. Costa Rica)47 in other areas of the world. Yet, the intention to draw upon
some degree of flexibility from the more intricate systems is apparent. As indicated in Table 2, all
the listed EU countries permit some legal deviations from the general wage floor. Exemptions or
differentiated rates apply to certain groups, such as young workers, disabled workers, the inexper-
ienced (trainees, interns and apprentices), or people within some professions that necessitate higher
levels of qualifications or skills or have specific occupational features. The first three categories
are linked with sub-average levels of productivity, whereas the last features above-average pro-
ductivity or special responsibility. Imposing a flat rate covering everyone would probably hinder
43. See Section 22, the German Minimum Wage Act.
44. ILO, ‘How Many Different Minimum Wage Rates Should There Be?’ (2016) Minimum Wage Policy Guide < http://
www.ilo.org/global/topics/wages/minimum-wages/rates/lang–en/index.htm> accessed 25 October 2016.
45. Eyraud, F. and Saget, C., The Fundamentals of Minimum Wage Fixing (ILO 2005).
46. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Sweden are typical examples that stick to collectively agreed minimumwages. Italy used to
include the possibility of introducing a statutory minimum wage in its reform of the Jobs Act, but this plan was finally
laid aside because of the strong criticism from trade unions. Cyprus is unique because its minimum wage law does not
stipulate a statutory minimum wage at national level, but sets specific rates for nine occupations.
47. Costa Rica brought in its minimum wage in 1933, which developed at the cantonal level and later at provincial level.
The system was very complicated, because it included differences by region, sector, occupation, enterprise size, skill
level, etc. and expanded at a high speed. Until 1987, the ambitious system had already embraced 520 specific minimum
wages. Afterwards, because of the difficulties in implementation, the National Wage Council gradually reduced the
number of minimum wage rates to 23. Nowadays, the system is still highly complex, consisting of minimum wages for
skilled, semi-skilled, unskilled and specialised workers, in addition to five different rates for varying education levels.
See ILO (n 44).
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less productive workers’ entry into the labour market, or discourage competent people to occupy
the more demanding jobs within society. This shared perception results in a similar rationale as is
behind the EU minimum wage systems in question.
What is notable is that Germany adopts somewhat distinctive strategies in respect of both
manner and condition of its legitimate deviations from the general wage floor. It is manifest that
the majority of countries in Table 2 display a preference for utilizing separate rates for certain
individual groups. Germany is unique in that it sets no sub-rate to supplement the standard rate. Its
acknowledgement of lower rates for newspaper delivery staff and for workers covered by deviating
regulations of existent collective agreements is merely makeshift,48 with a view to paving the way
for the full implementation of the uniform minimum wage in the near future. The other involved
groups are all exempt from the application of the legal wage floor.
However, adding sub-rates to the standard rate of a statutory minimum wage is a common
means of buffering the impact of absolute exclusion of certain groups. Passing over this
middle-ground approach means that the scope of exclusion must be defined cautiously— as
small as possible but as large as necessary. Germany seems to have followed this principle
and put strict restrictions on the exempted groups: for young workers, only those under 18
years old and without any completed vocational training are not regarded as workers within
the meaning of the Minimum Wage Act;49 interns are entitled to wages above the statutory
minimum unless the internship is a compulsory part of the education or apprenticeship;50 as
regards the long-term unemployed, minimum wage protection is only absent in the first six
months of any new employment.51
It should be clarified that the six-month exclusion of those who used to be long-term unem-
ployed is not a finalised rule as yet. The federal government was obliged to report to the legislative
bodies on 1 June 2016 about the extent to which this rule can promote the reintegration of the long-
term unemployed into the labour market and provide an assessment concerning whether it should
continue.52 In other words, verified positive effects on the reentry of long-term unemployed people
into the labour market will be the only effective justification for the necessity of this rule.
Meanwhile, vocational training or education is the key factor highlighted in the other exemption
situations. There is reason to believe that such a legislative predisposition is connected with the
system of dual vocational training in Germany.53 Dual vocational training is a system that com-
bines vocational schooling and structured learning through work experience in undertakings to
help young people improve skill and qualification levels.54 It engages a major proportion of young
German people and constitutes a formalised core of new entrants into the labour market. The point
emphasised here is that while the school-based part of vocational education is government
financed, the remainder of the training— the apprenticeship and on-the-job learning—hinges on
48. Section 24, the German Minimum Wage Act.
49. Section 22 (2), ibid.
50. Section 22 (1), ibid.
51. Section 22 (4), ibid.
52. Section 22 (4), ibid.
53. In Europe, only a small number of countries—Austria, Denmark, Switzerland, and Germany—have established sys-
tems of dual vocational training. However, among all the EU countries that have a general statutory minimum wage,
Germany is the unique one that has this sort of training system.
54. Pitch, E., ‘Does Vocational Training Help Young People Find A (Good) Job?’ (2015) IZA World of Labor. <http://
wol.iza.org/articles/does-vocational-training-help-young-people-find-good-job.pdf> (accessed 25 October 2016).
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the willingness of enterprises to afford the training costs within the firms.55 It is well recognised in
Germany that applying a remuneration rate that is considerably below the wage of a low-paid full-
timer to involved young people is an acceptable and even necessary trade-off for motivated
companies to commit themselves to the dual vocational training system. In one sense, instead of
suffering, young people without completed vocational education benefit from moderate earnings,
because regular and better-paid jobs will be more attainable after they complete the systematic
training and education.
3.2 Pros and cons of the German model
The German minimum wage law is less complex to implement in comparison to that of other EU
Member States. This is a major advantage. As concluded by the ILO, single-rate minimum wage
systems are superior to multi-rate ones in the following aspects: 1) the determination of the initial
rate and subsequent adjustment only requires relatively simple aggregate information and macro-
economic data, which a wage-setting body (say, a national minimum wage commission) can
manage to process and analyse with the aid of professionals; 2) a single rate is easier to commu-
nicate and disseminate so that keeping people informed as well as implementing the adjustments
would prove more effortless; 3) a single-rate minimum wage also lowers the difficulty of moni-
toring, given that inspectors need not consider the differences between sectors, groups, regions,
occupations, or enterprise sizes, but just compare the actual wages with the wage floor; 4) the
chance is greatly reduced that an enterprise refrains from hiring many an employee or moves to less
developed regions in order to benefit from lower minimum wage rates.56
Nevertheless, a corresponding drawback is that an undifferentiated statutory minimum wage
can hardly benefit different levels of working poor. Choosing this solution amounts to throwing
away the opportunity to enlarge the actual influence of the new wage floor. What is more proble-
matic is that the German model is unable to avoid the ethical and legal concerns primarily faced by
systems that adopt sub-minimum wage rates.57
Critics of sub-minimum wage rates have mainly raised awareness of the possible violation of
the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value. The principle was initially acknowl-
edged by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919,58 and written into the Preamble of the ILO Constitution,
as a key element of social justice.59 Afterwards, it was entrenched by the reiteration in the Equal
Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No.100). However, the concept of the principle had been limited
to ‘equal pay for men and women doing work of equal value’. It was not until the adoption of the
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111) that the principle was
officially broadened to protect workers with different characteristics. In spite of the strong con-
nection to Convention No. 100, Convention No. 111 aims to eliminate all distinctions, exclusions
or preferences in respect of employment and occupation.
55. ibid.
56. ILO (n 44).
57. The principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value is different from the principle of equal pay for equal work.
The latter refers to equal pay for two persons that undertake the same work in the same area of activity and in the same
enterprise.
58. Article 427, Treaty of Versailles.
59. Constitution of the ILO, as amended in 1946 to add a specific reference to equal remuneration for work of equal value
in the Preamble (originally stated in Article 41).
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Conventions No.100 and No.111 are both fundamental ILO Conventions, and as a result are
ratified by all EU Member States.60 The prevalent use of sub-minimum wage rates within the EU
can be attributed to a belief that some groups’ work is of less value than that of normal employees
per unit time, as illustrated earlier. However, the truth is that productivity level not only varies from
group to group, but also from individual to individual. It is questionable whether every individual
in a generally advantaged group has the requisite mental and physical qualities to guarantee higher
productivity. Indeed, a disadvantaged but industrious employee sometimes can outperform a
normal one who is sluggish and inactive. In this case it is not convincing to apply a lower minimum
wage to the more productive person.
A bigger problem may be found in the usage of sub-minimum wage rates. The disabled, the
young, the long-term unemployed, trainees, interns and apprentices are all typical disadvantaged
groups in the labour market. Nonetheless, as shown in Table 2, differentiated rates are not estab-
lished for every foregoing group, no matter in which country. For example, Luxemburg sets lower
rates for young workers, but entitles the disabled, the long-term unemployed, trainees and interns
to receive the standard rate. It is necessary to query how the legislators determine that young
workers are systematically of lower productivity while other groups under discussion are not.
Unless the decision is backed by an evaluation comparing the average productivity levels of all
groups, any imposition of sub-minimum wage rates would appear subjective and optional.
Moreover, there are numerous variables that intertwine and produce diverse effects on
employee productivity, such as gender, age, experience, physical condition, skill level, job type
and regional and sectoral features. It is worth contemplating why the gender-based difference is a
taboo in justifying the wage gaps between groups whereas other variables are considered as good
reasons for differentiated wage protection. In practice, granted that a country attempts to promote
the employment of women by catering to the potential preference of employers, it would not
formally legalise less favourable remuneration for female workers. Instead, lower minimum wage
rates might be imposed on where female employees predominate in the name of sectoral or
occupational differences.61As a matter of fact, the principle of equal remuneration for work of
equal value is merely in theory applied to all kinds of employees that are likely to be discriminated
against in labour legislation. Voices against the incautious introduction of sub-minimum wage
rates have never been loud enough to break the parochialism in the application of the principle. Nor
have they provoked overwhelming discussions about the incorporation of productivity variables
into an integrated evaluation system that provides both qualitative and quantitative bases for
differentiated minimum wage protection.
Although the German minimumwage law prescribes a single rate, the excluded groups in nature
receive differentiated treatment. Similar problems arise with regard to the legitimacy for exempt-
ing these people from the minimum wage protection. In fact, the problems pertain to all minimum
wage systems that abandon absolute egalitarianism in exchange for necessary flexibility. This sort
of compromise is not necessarily good or bad per se. The crux is whether every determination in
relation to weakening or removing minimum wage protection is robustly held to ensure that the
60. See the ILO Information System on International Labour Standards< http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/ f?
p¼1000:10011::: NO:10011: P10011_DISPLAY_BY, P10011_CONVENTION_TYPE_CODE:1, F> accessed 2Jan-
uary 2017.
61. ILO, ‘General Survey of the Reports on the Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 131), and the Minimum
Wage Fixing Recommendation, 1970 (No. 135)’ (International Labour Conference, Geneva, February 2014).
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original purpose is best served and the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value
is respected to the highest possible degree. This makes great demands on minimum wage
legislation. In particular, concerning the first minimum wage law of Germany, existing inap-
propriateness can only be ferreted out by years of post-implementation assessment. A saving
grace is that by placing training or education-related restrictions on the exclusion of interns,
young workers and trainees, Germany’s current legislation demonstrates a tendency to build
up relatively objective and consistent criteria for filtering out who is to stand a credible
chance of being less productive and therefore, needing reduced wage protection in a national
context.
4. Germany’s potential loss of efficiency adjusting the national
minimum wage
4.1 Adjustment method
Domestic policymaking and lawmaking on the adjustment of the national minimum wage mainly
tackle two issues— the method and frequency. In the EU, three major adjustment methods are
recognised. The first is the indexation method, whereby the national minimum wage is adjusted
automatically in the wake of the changes of certain economic indicators. The second is the
negotiation method, basing the adjustment of the national minimum wage on negotiations between
employers and trade unions. The state is only responsible for transposing the negotiation outcomes
into the minimum wage legislation. Thirdly, there is the consultation method, which involves
employers, trade unions and sometimes other people—for instance, academics—in institutiona-
lised consultations on the adjustment of the minimum wage, however, ensures the state has the
final say.62
According to the DICE database, the vast majority of EU Member States with national mini-
mum wages have introduced indexation or consultation methods or the combination of both for the
adjustment.63 The reason is that they are more timely and effective means of adjusting minimum
wages. The indexation method makes sure that a minimum wage is adjusted regularly in light of
variations in consumer prices, wage development or inflation. With a consultation method, the
government lives up to its responsibility and takes necessary control over the adjustment of the
national minimum wage.
Germany is a rare exception in that it has brought in a bipartite negotiation method.64 It rules out
automatic adjustments in line with changes of cost-living indexes, excuses the government from an
obligation to construct decent minimum wage levels, and leaves the entire decision to collective
bargaining parties. Although the procedure takes the form of minimumwage commission members
voting upon resolutions in respect to the adjustment of the national minimum wage, the compe-
tition between employer organisations and trade unions is still the determinant. It is noteworthy
that in Germany’s national minimum wage commission, apart from members with voting rights
coming out of trade unions and employer associations, there are two advisory members without
62. Schulten, T., ‘MinimumWage Regimes in Europe, and What Germany Can Learn from Them’ (2014) Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung Study < http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/10558.pdf> accessed 5 January 2017.
63. DICE Database, ‘Minimum Wage Exemption / Differentiation across Groups, 2006 – 2015’ (2015) < http://www.ce
sifo-group.de/DICE/fb/3qAFjJEFH> accessed 5 January 2017.
64. According to Section 4-10, the German Minimum Wage Act.
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voting rights chosen from the scientific community.65 From this perspective, the negotiation
method adopted by the German legislation shares some similarities with the consultation method.
Yet, it is distinguished from the consultation method in essence because the ultimate decision on
minimum wage adjustment does not lie with the state.
Attention should be paid to the fact that Germany’s adoption of a bipartite negotiation method
indeed reflects adherence to the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association. To be specific,
the German Basic Law ensures every individual and every occupation or profession the right to
form associations in order to safeguard and improve working and economic conditions.66 The
entitlement to form and act through trade unions and employer associations is rigidly protected,
and simultaneously, the government plays a very limited role in setting working conditions.67
There is generally no room for the government to exert control over matters that are typically
negotiated by employee and employer associations; legislation enforcing a wage freeze or an
increase would be challenged in terms of its constitutionality, unless it is applicable across all
sectors.68 In principle, the adjustment of the national minimum wage belongs to the scope within
which the state is allowed to intervene, because it involves the whole economy instead of only
certain sectors. However, the legislature of the Minimum Wage Act has made a ‘path-dependent’
option, despite the attempt to reform the national labour relations via the new legislation.
4.2 Adjustment frequency tied up with the adopted method
The German pace of adjusting the wage floor every other year69 sets a record for the scantiest
adjustments amongst all the EU countries with explicit provisions on the adjustment frequency.
This is a consequence of the adjustment method, indeed. As the sole representative of the bipartite
negotiation model within the EU, Germany attaches greater importance to social partner agreement
upon adjustment plans than the practical development of the minimum wage level. Thus, a
definitely lower frequency is prescribed for the updating of the minimum wage rate.
On the contrary, the meaning of the indexation method lies in adapting minimum wage adjust-
ments to the changes to the living costs of working families and other economic conditions.
Therefore, at least within the EU, countries adopting this method usually specify one year (e.g.
in Luxembourg, Belgium, France, Malta, Slovenia, etc.) or a shorter period (for instance, six
months in the Netherlands) as the interval between regular adjustments. Occasional political
adjustments are added during this period for the purpose of coping with extra risks caused by the
automatic updating of the minimum wage or abnormal index variations.
In Member States where consultation methods have been developed, the timeliness of minimum
wage adjustments may not be valued as much as the balance between social acceptance and the
government’s domination in decision-making. A few countries falling into this category fail to
stipulate how frequently the national minimum wage rate should be adjusted (e.g. Bulgaria and
Romania), while others basically mandate annual adjustments of the national minimumwages (e.g.
UK and Croatia).
65. Section 4 (2), ibid.
66. Article 9 (3), the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz fu¨r die Bundesrepublik Deutschland).
67. Bro¨hmer, J., Hill, C. and Spitzkatz, M., (eds) 60 Years German Basic Law: The German Constitution and Its Court’
(2nd edn, MCLJ 2012).
68. ibid.
69. Section 9 (1), the German Minimum Wage Act.
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4.3 The lost efficiency: a diminutive growth of € 0.34costs two years
After being frozen for two full years, the first German minimum wage rate of € 8.5per hour will
finally be replaced by a new one of €8.84 from January 2017. The real development of national
minimum wages has been modest in the whole of Europe since the 2000s, due to the economic
cycle.70 However, it can more or less be anticipated that Germany —the largest European econ-
omy—would probably fall behind many of its counterparts in terms of providing an assurance
regarding stable and regular increases of the minimum wage.
It is stated at the beginning of this article that the deterioration of the imbalance between the
strength of the two parties at the ‘bargaining table’ is the fundamental cause of the introduction of a
national minimum wage in Germany. Against this background, employing a method that virtually
rests with both sides’ ability to exert political pressure is tantamount to putting ‘old wine in new
bottles’. The German trade unions do not possess the power to force substantial minimum wage
adjustments with which employers take issue.71
Despite the German legislation setting a chairperson who has the casting vote in the minimum
wage commission so as to prevent a potential deadlock, the trade unions’ plight is not improved,
and adequate adjustments are unlikely to take place. To be specific, the chairperson is appointed
upon a joint proposal of the central employer and the employee organisations; if no joint
proposal is made, the chair will rotate between the nominees of both sides.72 In the former
scenario, the jointly nominated chairperson is under pressure from both parties, especially the
influential employer side. Nothing more than a mild increase of the national minimum wage can
be guaranteed. In the latter scenario, there seem to be opportunities to elevate the wage floor
markedly when trade union nominees chair the passing of adjustment resolutions. Nevertheless,
it should be taken into consideration that the chairperson is requested to abstain from voting
immediately if the resolution does not have the majority of votes cast. A compromise proposal
has to be made firstly, and the chairperson’s decisive vote must not be cast unless the compro-
mise proposal lacks the majority of votes.73 That is to say that capturing the position of chair-
manship does not necessarily enable the trade unions to reach sufficient adjustments of the
national minimum wage.
In the meantime, the biennial rhythm of adjustments worsens the situation. The initial rate and
Kaitz index value of the German minimum wage are already below those of a number of EU
Member States. These gaps are likely to continuingly widen, by reason of the infrequent updates
that cannot catch up with the adjustment speeds of other countries nor the changes happening
within the German domestic wage structure in general. Moreover, the two-year adjustment cycle
prolongs the shortest interval between considerable increases of the national minimum wage to
four years, because in the German context, trade unions have little chance of bringing about ample
adjustments during the chairmanship of its opponent, and can only expect to gain the upper hand
after another biennium.
It is clear that Germany is crying out for a more dynamic and forceful system to update the
national minimum wage so that the spreading of in-work poverty across the country can be
addressed more efficiently. The indexation or consultation method needs adopting as a supplement
70. Schulten (n 62).
71. ibid.
72. Section 6, the German Minimum Wage Act.
73. Section 10(2), ibid.
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or alternative to the retrogressive negotiation procedure. In addition, no matter whether the
adjustment frequency is specified, wage floors should be revised opportunely.
5. An implementation system flawed by inadequate preparation
of essential rules or conditions
Level of difficulty in implementing a national minimum wage is influenced by the other three
components of a minimum wage regime discussed in this article. Nevertheless, only the imple-
mentation system per se directly deals with the ways and process of putting the minimumwage into
practice, and remains at the core of achieving employer compliance.
In view of the legislative experiences of a number of EU countries, a successful implementation
system should touch upon the following key points in order to guarantee the execution of a national
minimum wage: 1) instructions for employers must be clear and precise enough to comply with,
inter alia those defining the contents of the minimum wage and its relationship with working hours;
2) the whole implementation system will come to nothing if there is no efficient monitoring; 3) to
overcome moral persuasion’s lack of binding force, it is a must to introduce serious sanctions that
deter non-compliance by making lawbreaking costs overweigh potential benefits; 4) employees
deserve assistance in suing employers in order to recover minimum wage arrears, in particular
the circumstances where supervision loopholes exist and unfair dismissal or victimisation may
take place.
Below is an analysis of the existence and adequacy of these conditions for implementing the
German Minimum Wage Act.
5.1 Provisions on calculating hourly remuneration and recording working hours
The primary technical issues envisaged to have direct effects on the realisation of a min-
imum wage entitlement are: a) which parts of remuneration should count towards the hourly
wage of an employee; b) how the working hours are calculated and recorded. Until both
issues are settled properly, ambiguities can give rise to factual evasion of the obligation to
pay above the wage floor and set barriers for monitoring and liability identification. The
UK has actually set a model in this regard since its national minimum wage was first
introduced nearly two decades ago, under which the government endeavours to provide
exhaustive guidance on the foregoing questions in order to eliminate misapprehensions in
practice.74
By contrast, the ‘immature’ minimum wage law of Germany has hitherto made much less
efforts to clarify the issues listed above. Firstly, there is no explanation about what components
74. The UK National Minimum Wage Act 1998 authorises the Secretary of State to make detailed provisions that clarify
the determination of the hourly wage rate at which a person is actually paid by the employer in any pay reference period
(section 2) and the maintenance of records as are relevant to establishing whether or not the worker has, for any pay
reference period to which the records relate, been remunerated above the national minimum wage rate (section 9&10).
Accordingly, a government guidance (titled ‘Guidance on Calculating the Minimum Wage’) consisting of systematic
rules has been introduced to solve the aforementioned practical issues. The Secretary of State has overall responsi-
bilities for the government department that publishes this guidance. First published in April 2013, the Guidance is
updated quite often. The latest version published in October 2016 is already the 11th update. See<https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/calculating-the-minimum-wage#history> accessed 20 December 2016.
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make up an employee’s hourly remuneration.75 In the face of the Federal Council’s criticism that
the unavailability of concrete criteria could undermine the minimum wage, the Federal Govern-
ment argues that the calculation of the minimum wage has indeed been clarified by the case law of
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Federal Labour Court (BAG). The fact is that no
further detailed conclusions can be drawn from the ECJ and BAG case law, except from the
principle of only payments recompensing the agreed normal performance being included in the
calculation of the minimum wage.76 Therefore, it is merely possible to confirm that bonuses for
additional work (e.g. wages for overtime, public holidays, shift work and night work), payments
with specific purposes (e.g. pension contributions, reimbursements), or voluntary compensations
by third parties (e.g. tips) should be counted out. Salary elements that cannot be clearly recognised
as payments for an employee’s normal performance (e.g. 13th month’s wage, year-end bonuses,
Christmas bonuses, holiday bonuses) continue to be controversial among academics, judicial
authorities and the government.77
Apart from the calculation of hourly remuneration, the total amount of working hours in a pay
reference period is a pivotal factor that could be falsified to sidestep the wage floor. Different from
the UK law, which imposes a universal obligation to record working hours by elaborating on
measurement rules in various situations, the German MinimumWage Act only includes simplified
regulations that oblige employers to document the commencement, end and duration of employ-
ees’ daily working hours and retain the records for at least two years. More importantly, these
regulations just apply to marginal part-time jobs and the specific sectors or industry branches
defined in section 2a of the Act to Combat Clandestine Employment.78
The current legislative pattern seems not to conform to the social reality in Germany. As
mentioned earlier, a considerable proportion of full-timers, chiefly in the East Germany, earn
hourly wages roughly above or below € 8.5. Provided that these employees are frequently com-
pelled to do additional unpaid work, the actual salaries they receive for each hour are likely to fall
(further) below the minimum wage. Besides, when a piecework principle—work paid for accord-
ing to the amount produced— is adopted by employers, it is also difficult to ensure hourly wage
rates above the wage floor. The most effective way to reduce these manipulative behaviours of
employers in low-wage sectors is sticking to the principle that the minimum wage must be
achieved for every hour actually worked, which is confirmed by the explanatory memorandum
attached to the law, and setting up common rules for the measurement of working time.
Yet, imposing an indiscriminate obligation to record working hours sometimes runs counter to
economic realities, given the diverse features of different occupations and sectors. For example, for
a salesman travelling between cities to market products all year round, it is almost impossible to
75. The BMAS provides some explanations about the components of an employee’s hourly wage and the calculation and
recording of working hours in a pay reference period for the purposes of the German Minimum Wage Act, see BMAS
(n20). However, it differs from the UK government guidance referred to in the previous footnote. First, the German
MinimumWage Act does not authorise the BMAS to make supplementary regulations on forgoing issues in its text, so
it is constitutionally questionable if BMAS explanations represent the attitudes of legislators. Second, the inter-
pretations of the BMAS are far less precise, certain and comprehensive than a real guidance, and can probably only
offer reference for employers and employees in understanding the German Minimum Wage Act.
76. Schulten, T., ‘Preconditions for Successful Implementation of the New Minimum Wage in Germany’ (2015) Global
Labour Column, No. 197<http://www.global-labour-university.org/fileadmin/GLU_Column/papers/no_197_Schul
ten.pdf>accessed 5 January 2017.
77. ibid.
78. Section 17, the German Minimum Wage Act.
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precisely distinguish between the occupational and private behaviours that are subsumed by the
manner of working. Another example is a warehouse guard. The person employed to take care of
the products and facilities of a warehouse may be provided with a residence nearby and required to
be prepared to handle emergencies at any time, but in reality, this person does not work 24/7.
Personal activities, such as dining, rest and recreations, just proceed between routine inspections.
In both instances, maintaining timesheets is challenging, due to the inexistence of apparent
demarcation between on and off work. It may only be workable when minimum wage legislation
is sophisticated insofar as rules about the measurement of working hours are designed for all
possible movements of the employees in the above two examples. However, this is an endless
and impractical task. Take UK, for instance. Its legislative model is one that attempts to exemplify
as many scenarios as possible and tailor rules for different situations. This includes the calculation
method of time spent travelling on business and criteria for judging the nature of sleeping hours
between duties. Still, many possibilities that need clarification on the measurement of working
time have been left out. That is because each case may be different, and a written law cannot cover
all eventualities.
Therefore, the core idea advanced here is that perhaps the German minimum wage legislation
should not have narrowed the application of regulations on working time recording to mini-jobs
and sectors susceptible to illegal employment. This increases the likelihood that low-wage earners
outside these limits could not practically reach the minimum wage entitlements. At the same time,
considering the difficulties of recording employees’ precise working time in some occupations or
sectors, legislators must come up with substitutes for a ‘one-size-fits-all’ settlement. Two possible
approaches suggest themselves. First, the obligation to record working time could be forced widely
on employers, however, the prerequisite is that authorised departments of the Federal Government
legislate on how employers may simplify or modify the general manner of recording and retaining
workers’ working hours whenever specific features of an occupation or sector necessitate altera-
tions.79 Second, in some exceptional cases, recording the working time of employees is not
difficult, but is infeasible. Employers should be eligible to apply for exemption from the duty if
ensuring employees annual or monthly gross salaries above a certain high amount. In doing so,
working time autonomy is given back to occupations and sectors that feature unmeasurable
working length or need employees to be on standby, and simultaneously, less opportunities are
left for employers to bypass the hourly minimum wage.
5.2 The major monitoring authority and ‘risk-oriented’ approach
More than one government authority gets involved in the inspection of employer adherence to the
minimum wage law in Germany, but the Financial Inspectorate of Undeclared Employment
(Finanzkontrolle Schwarzarbeit (FKS)) is tasked with the leading role in this regard, as has been
the case with sectoral minimum wages in the past. The basic reason for this is that this customs unit
responsible for enforcing the law on illicit employment and benefit fraud is endowed with exten-
sive investigatory powers to serve the original purpose of prosecuting cases of illicit employment,
nicely facilitating intensive monitoring of the minimum wage. Compliance with the statutory wage
79. This is actually promoting an expansion of the application of Section 17, paragraph 4 of the German Minimum Wage
Act, which urges the BMF to determine by way of a statutory instrument how employers referred to in paragraph1 may
alter the general way of recording and retaining the working time of workers in so far as this is necessary on account of
the specific features of a sector or occupation.
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floor is required to be examined during all FKS audits. Relevant information found by authorities
that shoulder other labour protection responsibilities, such as the pension funds, trade inspecto-
rates, employment agencies, social security funds, etc. in workplace checks shall be transferred to
the FKS.
While the FKS has been expected to initiate massive scrutiny of the carrying out of the
minimum wage in enterprises, the reality is somewhat disappointing. According to the figures
provided by the Federal Ministry of Finance (Bundesministerium der Finanzen (BMF)), the FKS
checked around 43,700 enterprises in 2015, over 30% less than the amount of 63,000 in 2014. In
the construction sector, which is particularly vulnerable to illicit employment and ‘wage dumping’,
the number of inspections fell by approximately half to 17,000.80
The sudden decline of investigations originates from the incapacity of the FKS to handle the
soaring workload caused by the additional mission of enforcing the minimum wage with the
present staffing levels. More than a decade ago, the former Finance Minister Hans Eichel (SPD)
launched a plan for increasing the amount of FKS customs officers gradually from 5,200 to 7,000
to cope with the long-standing staff shortage. At that time, an extra demand of investigating
officers as a result of the introduction of a national minimum wage was not considered. According
to the Ministry of Finance, 600 of the 6865 positions initially planned for 2015 had not yet been
filled. To take over the monitoring of the national minimum wage, another 1,600 customs inves-
tigators are needed, but further recruitment has been delayed to the financial years of 2017-
2022.Worse still, hundreds of the existing FKS employees have been dispatched to the Federal
Office for Migration and Refugees to help with the current necessity of refugee control.81
Thus, the FKS has adopted a ‘risk-oriented’ approach for checks on unreported employment as
well as compliance with the minimum wage, reducing the total number of investigations and
concentrating available resources on the revelation of suspected major violations. Despite the
concern that such an approach may tempt fraudulent businesses—construction companies in
particular—to make profits from illicit employment and disobedience to the minimum wage law,
the FKS has no other viable option at present.82
In fact, the problem does not lie in the insufficient preparation of the FKS for the expanded task,
but in reality, there is no specialised labour inspectorate in Germany. Administrative control of
working conditions, leaving aside occupational health and safety, is quite a new challenge for the
German system of labour relations. At the moment, the complex mission to compel observance of a
national minimum wage can only be assigned to an authority like the FKS who possesses a
relatively higher capability of accomplishing the undertaking, despite not having reached the
requisite staffing level. To some extent, it is an obvious consequence that the efficacy of minimum
wage monitoring will continue to be thwarted by the staff shortage of the FKS in the next few
years. Furthermore, due to the shortage of relevant experience in the inspection of working
conditions, a prudent stance is likely to be maintained by the legislature on the way how the FKS
manages this task.
80. O¨chsner, T., ‘Mindestlohn: Firmen mu¨ssen sich kaum vor Kontrollen fu¨rchten’ Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung (Berlin, 19
February 2016) < http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/mindestlohn-seltene-ueberraschungsbesuche-1.2869276>
accessed 5 January 2017.
81. ibid.
82. Berlin (dpa), ‘Weniger Arbeitgeber-Kontrollen im ersten Mindestlohn-Jahr’ Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung (Berlin, 19 February
2016) <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/news/karriere/arbeitsmarkt-weniger-arbeitgeber-kontrollen-im-ersten-mindestlohn-
jahr-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-160219-99-865270> accessed 5 January 2017.
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5.3 Sanctions
In the EU, the most common sanctions for disobeying national minimum wages are pecuniary ones
in the manner of fines. Still, discrepancies widely exist between the legislation of Member States
with respect to the criteria of determining levels of fines and the diversity of penalties. As shown by
the ILO Working Conditions Laws Database,83 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech, Estonia, Greece and
Spain offer a numerical range of the whole fine system, requiring enforcement authorities to
exercise discretion based on both the seriousness and type of violations. France, Hungary and the
Netherlands clearly identify the number of employees concerned as a factor that should influence
the total amount of a fine. The difference is that France and the Netherlands specify how much an
employer will be fined if one employee is paid below the minimum wage—the penalty shall be
applied as many times as there have been violations,84 while Hungary stipulates different ranges of
fines for cases involving one or multiple employees. Apart from the quantity of employees with
unsatisfied minimum wage entitlements, statutory reasons for increasing or reducing fines mainly
include repeat offences (e.g. in Hungary, Luxemburg and the Netherlands), severe accidents
incurred by violations (e.g. in Slovakia), the turnover of an enterprise (e.g. in Portugal) and
company size (e.g. in Slovenia).
Despite the dominance of financial penalties, a few EU countries (e.g. Belgium, Romania and
Ireland) adopt imprisonment as an alternative. Offending against minimum wage entitlements of
employees in these countries results in liabilities of fines or incarceration, or both.
In comparison with the rest of the EU, Germany has set a quite high upper range limit (€ 500,000)
for the whole fine resulting from a failure to pay employees above the wage floor in due time. How
factors, such as the number of involved employees, economic losses caused by violations, repeated
offences and company scale should affect a penalty decision is not specified. Breaching one of the
ancillary obligations to cooperate with enforcement authorities in audits, to notify the required
information and relevant changes in due time and prescribed manner, and to record and retain
employees’ working time properly can give rise to a fine of up to € 30,000.85 An enterprise that
has been fined more than € 2,500 shall be excluded from public procurement procedures in the fields
of delivery, construction and service until its reliability has been reestablished.86
In short, the sanction system for propping up the implementation of the German minimum wage
has demonstrated two primary characteristics. Firstly, although imprisonment is not adopted,
comparatively heavy economic penalties—significant fines plus loss of eligibility for tendering
for a contract of public procurement—have been introduced as strong deterrents for various types
of noncompliance with the Minimum Wage Act. Secondly, the domains in which offenders are
deprived of the capacity to participate in public procurement procedures are those particularly
susceptible to incorrect remuneration for employees because of high prevalence of low-paid work,
illegal employment or ‘mini-jobs’. These two points mirror that appropriate attention has been paid
to the effects of lawbreaking costs on employer adherence to the minimum wage and the possi-
bilities of creating sanctions pertaining to domestic industrial attributes.
83. See<http://www.ilo.org/dyn/travail/travmain.sectionChoice? p_structure¼> accessed December 10 2016.
84. Notwithstanding the similarities, a small difference exists between the French and Dutch legislation. The French law
provides for a specific fine for paying an employee below the minimum wage, whereas the Dutch law only sets the
upper limit of the fine for infringing on the minimum wage entitlement of an employee.
85. See Section 15,16,17,20 and 21, the German Minimum Wage Act.
86. See Section 19, ibid.
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A deficiency of the German Minimum Wage Act is that it lacks provisions requiring an
employer who infringes on a minimum wage entitlement to make a supplementary payment to
the involved employee within a specific time in order to meet the required legal standard. The same
loopholes are found in the legislation of other member states, except in the Netherlands, Malta and
the UK. Whether liability to repay minimum wage arrears is prescribed as a component of the
enforcement system of a minimum wage makes an essential difference. With the existence of this
statutory liability, there is a higher chance that an employer will cover the shortfall as required by
order of the enforcement authority so as to avoid further serious legal consequences. An employee
need not necessarily resort to litigation to claim adequate remuneration. Conversely, when the
statutory liability under discussion is absent, an employer may attempt to put off remunerating the
employee to reach the wage floor, and it is more likely that an employee will take legal action and
request arrears based on the judicial decision.
5.4 Viability of minimum wage litigation
Individual employees are not inclined to make use of judicial proceedings to realize minimum
wage entitlements for fear of job loss or potential revenge tactics from employers. The situation
can be altered, however, if effective assistance is provided for them in applying the right to judicial
remedy. This is of particular significance for Germany, where the law fails to urge an offender to
pay back arrears and an employee stands a good chance of needing to sue the employer in a court of
law to receive minimum wage. Nevertheless, the German Minimum Wage Act has completely
omitted this section of legislation that should have been put in place to improve the viability of
minimum wage litigation.
As opposed to Germany, many Member States that recognise employees’ vulnerability in
lawsuits against powerful employers offer constructive solutions in the domestic legislation. For
instance, in the UK, an officer of the HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC)—the authority that
enforces the national minimum wage—can take a case to an employment tribunal or county civil
court (or Scottish equivalent) on behalf of an employee with a view to enforcing the minimum
wage entitlement to be applied. If the employee suffers unfair dismissal or any detriment by the
employer, the employee is entitled to present a complaint to an employment tribunal. In France, the
associative right of a labour organisation to sue on behalf of employees is acknowledged. There-
fore, trade unions can bring class action lawsuits to protect the rights of employees to be paid above
the national minimum wage.87
It is unsure which of the existing solutions agrees with the German national conditions, or
whether Germany is in need of another way out. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the realisation
of minimum wage entitlements will be frustrated if the corresponding regulations remain unavail-
able in the German law.
6. Conclusion
Despite the fact that Germany’s introduction of a wage floor from the beginning of 2015 was a
great breakthrough for national poverty reduction and wage structure rationalisation, it is perhaps
not complete. This article throws doubts over the effects of this major policy change at a legislative
87. Schulten (n76).
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level. By examining the German Minimum Wage Act in terms of the general minimum wage rate,
flexibility in application, adjustment method and frequency, and implementation system from an
EU perspective, it reveals that this legislation, despite making noticeable progress in some regards,
has a huge potential for improvement.
A minimum wage of € 8.5 can hardly curb the in-work poverty across Germany according to the
Kaitz index measurement. An evaluation in terms of PPS indicates a less pessimistic result, though.
Current authoritative estimations disagree on the precise amount of latent beneficiaries, but it is
certain that the main beneficiaries are those trapped in serious poverty for multiple interweaved
reasons, in particular female mini-jobbers, and that the German average poor will not virtually
benefit from the new minimum wage. An often-neglected problem with the general level of the
German minimum wage is its unsuccessful link-up with the pre-existing income support and tax
and contribution collection systems, which tends to significantly detract from the efficiency in
promoting people’s economic activeness.
Germany has developed a distinctive model of flexibility within the general wage floor. It sets
no sub-rate on top of the standard rate, but puts strict restrictions in relation to vocational training
and education, on most groups exempted from the application of the minimum wage. Such a model
is easier to implement, but the disadvantage is that it cannot exert actual influence over different
levels of working poor nor avoid the ethical and legal concerns faced by multi-rate systems.
Ignoring the indexation and consultation methods prevalent in other Member States, Germany
becomes the unique state that adopts a bipartite negotiation method of determining adjustments of
the national minimum wage. Tied up with the adopted method, a biennial rhythm of adjustments is
fixed. These two elements constitute an adjustment mechanism that is unable to ensure timely and
efficient adjustments in a country like Germany.
The greatest drawbacks of the German minimumwage law are embedded in the implementation
system. There is a lack of comprehensive guidance over the calculation of an employee’s hourly
remuneration and the measurement of working hours to make employers meet the minimum wage.
The FKS is assigned the undertaking of checking employer compliance with the minimum wage
due to its extensive investigatory power in the monitoring of illicit employment, but its present
staff level is far from adequate to handle both tasks. Compared with most other Member States,
Germany adopts severer economic penalties to deter noncompliance with the minimum wage, but
it fails to instruct offenders to repay arrears of wages, for which involved employees face a higher
risk of having to turn to judicial proceedings to protect personal interests. Unfortunately, the high
barriers standing in the way of an individual employee exercising the right to sue is entirely
disregarded by the German minimum wage law, and no legal measure is in place to promote the
viability of minimum wage litigation.
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